Unknowable Remedies: \u3cem\u3eAlbino v. Baca\u3c/em\u3e, The PLRA Exhaustion Requirement, and the Problem of Notice by Rubin, Ethan
Boston College Law Review
Volume 56
Issue 6 Electronic Supplement Article 12
5-13-2015
Unknowable Remedies: Albino v. Baca, The PLRA
Exhaustion Requirement, and the Problem of
Notice
Ethan Rubin
Boston College Law School, ethan.rubin@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement
and Corrections Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ethan Rubin, Unknowable Remedies: Albino v. Baca, The PLRA Exhaustion Requirement, and the Problem of Notice, 56 B.C.L. Rev. E.




UNKNOWABLE REMEDIES: ALBINO v. BACA, 
THE PLRA EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT, AND 
THE PROBLEM OF NOTICE 
Abstract: On April 3, 2014, in Albino v. Baca, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that when a prisoner plaintiff has not been informed of a 
prison administrative remedy, that remedy is effectively unavailable to the pris-
oner for the purposes of the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act (PLRA). This decision conflicts with what a majority of other circuits 
have established and widens the gap between those circuits on this issue. This 
Comment argues for the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve this circuit split in a fu-
ture case and hold that to fail to give a prisoner notice of an administrative rem-
edy is to make that remedy effectively unavailable. 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 1972 and 1996, the number of lawsuits filed pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district courts increased by 1,153%.1 In response to 
this significant increase in prisoner litigation in the federal court, Congress 
passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”). 2 The PLRA 
mandates that “inmates exhaust all available administrative remedies before 
filing any suit challenging prison conditions, including, but not limited to, 
suits under § 1983.”3 In evaluating the availability of administrative reme-
dies, many courts do not consider whether a plaintiff was given notice of the 
administrative remedies.4 This reasoning undermines the policies behind the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Barbara Belbot, Report on the Prison Litigation Reform Act: What Have the Courts Decided 
So Far?, 84 PRISON J. 290, 306 (2004); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (codifying the right to bring 
a civil action based on the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws). 
 2 See Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-71 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a)); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 117 (2006) (“The competing values that Congress 
sought to effectuate by enacting the PLRA were reducing the number of frivolous filings, on one 
hand, while preserving prisoners’ capacity to file meritorious claims, on the other.”). 
 3 Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Scott v. 
Albino, 135 S. Ct. 403 (2014); see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect 
to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner con-
fined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 
available are exhausted.”). 
 4 Tope v. Fabian, No. CIV 09-0734 DWF/RLE, 2010 WL 3307351, at *8 (D. Minn. July 29, 
2010); see Gonzales-Liranza v. Naranjo, 76 F. App’x 270, 272 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting the irrele-
vance of notice to the issue of whether or not a prisoner exhausted administrative remedies); 
Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an assistant attorney general 
need not inform a prisoner plaintiff of the need to follow administrative procedures). 
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PLRA—judicial efficiency and administrative agency—and fails to prevent 
unfair treatment of inmates.5 
In 2014, in Albino v. Baca, Plaintiff Juan Roberto Albino was arrested 
for rape under California Penal Code Section 261(a)(1) and placed in jail on 
May 11, 2006.6 Over the course of the next four months, Albino was raped 
and beaten by inmates three times in three different housing units.7 Before 
each attack, Albino had requested protective custody.8 Prison staff members 
declined the request and responded that it was Albino’s attorney’s job to pro-
tect him.9 According to Albino, he was not informed of any formal grievance 
system.10 Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting 
en banc, held that Albino satisfied the exhaustion requirement, reasoning that 
when an inmate has not been informed of prison administrative remedies, 
those remedies are effectively unavailable to that inmate.11  
This Comment argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should grant certio-
rari in a future case dealing with this issue, and adopt the Ninth Circuit's rea-
soning that an administrative remedy is effectively unavailable to a prisoner 
when the prisoner has not been notified of that remedy12 Part I examines the 
PLRA, the scope of its exhaustion requirement, and the application of both to 
Albino.13 Part II examines the role of notice in the courts’ determination of 
whether a plaintiff has exhausted all available administrative remedies.14 Fi-
nally, Part III argues for the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari in the fu-
ture for a case dealing with this issue, and hold that when a prisoner does not 
receive notice of an administrative remedy, that remedy is effectively una-
vailable.15 In doing so, the Court would further the policies underlying the 
PLRA—administrative agency and judicial efficiency—because a notice re-
quirement would enable inmates to use administrative remedies instead of 
clogging courts with lawsuits that are likely to be dismissed on exhaustion 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Adam Slutsky, Totally Exhausted: Why a Strict Interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) 
Unduly Burdens Courts and Prisoners, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289, 2298–2302 (2005) (identify-
ing the protection of administrative agency authority and the promotion of judicial efficiency as 
the twin purposes of administrative exhaustion); infra notes 71–82 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing why a notice requirement advances the policies underlying the PLRA). 
 6 See 747 F.3d at 1166. 
 7 See id. at 1166–67. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. at 1167 (“Of the ap[p]rox. 10 or so times plaintiff begged defendant custodial depu-
ties to be placed in segregation or for the[m] to help me, defendants[ ] responded that it was my 
attorney’s job to protect me. As these were sworn peace officers, I was of the belief that I had to 
seek my trial attorney’s help.”). 
 10 See id. at 1177. 
11 See id. 
 12 See infra notes 61–82 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 18–47 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 47–60 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 61–82 and accompanying text. 
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grounds.16 This notice requirement would prevent unfair treatment of prison-
ers, including the hide-and-seek behavior on the part of prison administra-
tors.17 
I. THE PLRA AND THE SCOPE OF ITS EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT 
In response to a dramatic increase in prisoner lawsuits, Congress enacted 
the PLRA to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.18 
The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust all available administrative remedies 
at a prison or jail before filing suit.19 As the facts of Albino illustrate, whether 
or not an inmate satisfies the exhaustion requirement may hinge on whether 
the remedies were in fact available to the prisoner.20 Section A discusses the 
PLRA, the exhaustion requirement, and the policies behind them.21 Section B 
explores the role of availability in the exhaustion requirement.22 Further, sec-
tion B then identifies the facts of Albino that supported the holding that reme-
dies were effectively unavailable to Albino.23 
A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act 
Congress enacted the PLRA to reduce the quantity and improve the 
quality of prisoner suits.24 Central to the PLRA is the exhaustion require-
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169; Russell v. Unknown Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Officers, No. C 
3786, 2004 WL 2997503, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2004) (asserting that a notice requirement com-
ports with the goal of fostering internal administrative resolutions in lieu of litigation in the 
courts); Burgess v. Garvin, No. 01 CIV 10994(GEL), 2004 WL 527053, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 
2004) (“[I]f the matter can be resolved without recourse to the federal courts . . . then the purpose 
of judicial economy is fulfilled.”); infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (discussing how a 
notice requirement would reinforce the policies underlying the PLRA).  
 17 See Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f we allowed jails 
and prisons to play hide-and-seek with administrative remedies, they could keep all remedies under 
wraps until after a lawsuit is filed and then uncover them and proclaim that the remedies were availa-
ble all along.”); see also Burgess, 2004 WL 527053, at *5 (“[Congress] cannot have meant that 
prisoners would be expected to exhaust remedies of which they were kept entirely ignorant.”); 
infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing how a notice requirement would prevent 
unfair treatment of prisoners). 
 18 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012); infra note 28 
and accompanying text (discussing the goal of the PLRA to reduce the quantity and improve the 
quality of prisoner suits). 
 19 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). 
 20 Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 
 21 See infra notes 24–34 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 35–40 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 41–47 and accompanying text. 
 24 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter, 534 U.S. at 524; see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 
(2007) (“In 2005, nearly 10 percent of all civil cases filed in federal courts nationwide were pris-
oner complaints challenging prison conditions or claiming civil rights violations. Most of these 
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ment.25 The exhaustion requirement requires inmates to exhaust all adminis-
trative remedies regarding complaints about prison conditions before initiat-
ing a lawsuit.26 This exhaustion requirement protects administrative agency 
authority by giving prison officials notice of a problem and allowing them to 
resolve disputes internally before being haled into court.27 Further, the ex-
haustion requirement promotes efficient resolution of claims because claims 
may be heard more quickly and economically in internal prison proceedings 
rather than in litigation.28 Moreover, the exhaustion requirement promotes the 
kind of judicial efficiency necessary for courts to hear meritorious claims in 
any reasonable timeframe.29 
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirm-
ative defense.30 The defendant must show that there was an available admin-
istrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.31 
The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to provide evidence showing that the 
generally available administrative remedies were effectively unavailable.32 
The availability of an administrative remedy is determined objectively: would 
a similarly situated person of ordinary firmness have considered the remedy 
                                                                                                                           
cases have no merit, many are frivolous.”); see also 141 CONG. REC. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 
1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting that roughly 94.7 percent of prisoner lawsuits in 1994 
were dismissed before pretrial); 141 CONG. REC. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Kyl) (“Federal prison lawsuits have risen from 2,000 in 1970 to 39,000 in 1994.”). 
 25 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Jones, 549 U.S. at 204. 
 26 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Jones, 549 U.S. at 204. 
 27 See Jones, 549 U.S. at 204; McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) (“Exhaustion 
serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial 
efficiency.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 
740–41 (2001); Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the PLRA 
exhaustion requirement is designed to provide notice to corrections officials so that they may 
address complaints internally). 
 28 See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89 (explaining how the exhaustion requirement promotes effi-
ciency). But cf. Collin O’Connor Udell, Parading the Saurian Tail: Projection, Jung, and the Law, 
42 ARIZ. L. REV. 731, 768 (2000) (asserting that “the PLRA provisions are plainly attempts by the 
collective to ‘circumvent prior, and to constrain future, judicial decisions’ affecting [the prisoner] 
population”). 
 29 See 141 CONG. REC. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The crush-
ing burden of these frivolous suits makes it difficult for courts to consider meritorious claims.”). 
 30 See 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 
 31 Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. See generally 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (codifying the exhaustion re-
quirement). 
 32 Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. 
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available.33 Where a generally available administrative remedy is effectively 
unavailable, the court will excuse a prisoner’s failure to exhaust.34 
B. Effectively Unavailable: The Availability of Administrative  
Remedies and Their Role in Albino 
Courts have held that a generally available administrative remedy can be 
effectively unavailable due to the action of prison officials.35 For example, 
when a prison official prevents a prisoner from utilizing an administrative 
remedy, that remedy is effectively unavailable.36 Moreover, a defendant may 
be estopped from raising a non-exhaustion defense if the prisoner was intimi-
dated by prison staff or was misled about the availability of administrative 
remedies.37 
It is less clear what kinds of inaction on the part of prison officials ren-
der an otherwise available administrative remedy effectively unavailable.38 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 688 (2nd Cir. 2004) (articulating the objective 
standard in the context of determining whether a prisoner exhausted available administrative rem-
edies). A remedy is available when it is capable of use, at hand, or otherwise available as a practi-
cal matter. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171. 
 34 See Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010) (excusing a prisoner plaintiff's 
failure to exhaust because prison officials prevented the prisoner from utilizing a grievance proce-
dure). 
 35 See, e.g., id. (asserting that an administrative remedy becomes effectively unavailable when 
a prison official prevents, thwarts, or hinders a prisoner's efforts to utilize the remedy); Lyon v. 
Vande Krol, 305 F.3d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a prisoner does not need to exhaust 
administrative remedies when prison officials have prevented the prisoner from exhausting such 
remedies); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a grievance procedure 
was unavailable to a prisoner when prison officials failed to respond to the prisoner’s requests for 
grievance forms). 
 36 Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2011) (“An administrative remedy is not 
‘available,’ and therefore need not be exhausted, if prison officials erroneously inform an inmate 
that the remedy does not exist or inaccurately describe the steps he needs to take to pursue it.”); 
Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that district courts 
must ensure that prisoners have not failed to exhaust administration remedies due to the action or 
inaction of prison officials.”).  
 37 See Martin v. Sizemore, No. Civ.A 05-CV-105-KKC, 2005 WL 1491210, at *3–4 (E.D. 
Ky., June 22, 2005) (holding that prison administrator defendants are estopped from raising ex-
haustion defense when the complaint system in the prison was set up such that the inmates must 
confront the subject of the complaint in order to submit a grievance); Simpson v. Gallant, 223 F. 
Supp. 2d 286, 292 (D. Me. 2002) (holding that a prison staff member who tells plaintiff his issue 
is not grievable is estopped from claiming non-exhaustion). But see Mendez v. Herring, No. 05-
1690 PHX/JAT, 2005 WL 3273555, at *2 (D. Ariz., Nov. 29, 2005) (finding that inmates are not 
excused from exhausting administrative remedies when they have been told their complaint is not 
grievable). 
 38 Compare Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 809 n.9 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prison staff 
do not need to affirmatively provide information on how to file a grievance), judgment vacated, 
549 U.S. 1190 (2007), abrogated by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), Yousef v. Reno, 254 
F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that prison officials need not advise prisoners of the 
need to follow administrative procedures), and Hahn v. Armstrong, No. 1:08 CV 169 LMB, 2010 
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For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has found that 
whether or not a plaintiff was ever informed of an administrative remedy is 
irrelevant to a determination of availability.39 In contrast, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that when an administrative remedy 
is “unknown and unknowable” to a prisoner, it is effectively unavailable.40 
In Albino, administrative remedies were not available to Albino due to 
the inaction of prison officials.41 For example, Albino claims he was never 
informed of a prison grievance system, that he was not given an inmate orien-
tation, and that he did not encounter a manual describing complaint proce-
dures.42 Although Albino begged approximately ten times to be placed in pro-
tective custody, prison officials told Mr. Albino to consult his attorney and 
never notified, constructively or otherwise, Albino of the option to file a 
grievance.43 
 Albino proceeded as a pro se litigant in the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California against Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca, 
several Doe defendants, and Los Angeles County, alleging violations of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, as well as several state laws, arising out of injuries Albino 
suffered while confined in Los Angeles County jail.44 The district court grant-
ed Baca’s motion for summary judgment because Albino had failed to ex-
haust his administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA.45 Although a 
three-judge panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently held that Albino satis-
fied the exhaustion requirement, reasoning that when an inmate has not been 
informed of prison administrative remedies, those remedies are effectively 
                                                                                                                           
WL 575748, at *4 (E.D. Mo., Feb. 11, 2010) (holding that a prison guard failing to assist a prison-
er complete a grievance procedure is insufficient to avoid Summary Judgment), with Sadler v. 
Rowland, No. 3:01CV1786(CFD)(WIG) 2004 WL 2061518, at *7 (D. Conn., Sept. 13, 2004) 
(declining to dismiss a claim when a Connecticut prisoner who transferred to a Virginia prison 
sought to complain about Virginia prison conditions and was not told to file a grievance in both 
prisons), and Hall v. Sheahan, No. 2000 C. 1649, 2001 WL 111019, at *2 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 2, 2001) 
(noting that a grievance procedure that is not made known to inmates is effectively unavailable to 
those inmates). 
 39 Gonzales-Liranza, 76 F. App’x at 272 (holding that “whether or not a plaintiff was ever 
advised or informed of a prison’s grievance procedures was not relevant” to a determination of ex-
haustion). 
 40 See Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1322–23 (finding that a prison grievance procedure described in a 
manual provided only to staff was not “available”). 
 41 See 747 F.3d at 1177. 
 42 Id. In fact, such a manual was not available, or even known, to the prisoners. Id. at 1175. 
Moreover, Albino did not encounter complaint forms or a complaint box. See id. at 1176. 
 43 See id. at 1175. 
 44 See Albino v. Baca, No. CV 08-3790-GAF(MLG), 2010 WL 883856, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 
10, 2010), rev’d en banc, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 45 See id. at *5. The district court accepted the recommendation of the magistrate judge, who 
recommended granting summary judgment for Baca because Albino did not exhaust available 
remedies at the jail. See id. at *1.  
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unavailable to that inmate. 46 On October 20, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied Baca’s petition for certiorari.47 
II. UNKNOWN REMEDIES: THE ROLE OF NOTICE IN THE EXHAUSTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
In 2014, in Albino v. Baca, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, held that the administrative remedies in the jail were not 
available to Albino within the meaning of the PLRA.48 In reaching this hold-
ing, the court stressed the lack of notice given to Albino by prison officials of 
the grievance system.49 The Ninth Circuit’s emphasis on the lack of notice is 
consistent with how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has 
approached issues of exhaustion.50 
In 2004, in Goebert v. Lee County, the Eleventh Circuit held that a pris-
on grievance procedure, which was described in a manual that inmates were 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1177. The Ninth Circuit also held that an exhaustion defense under 
the PLRA must be treated within the framework of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather 
than as an “unenumerated Rule 12(b)” motion. Id. at 1166 (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 
1108 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 47 See generally Scott v. Albino, 135 S. Ct. 403 (2014) (denying certiorari for Albino). 
 48 See 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom., Scott v. Albino, 135 S. Ct. 
403 (2014). In addition to holding that the administrative remedies in the jail were not available to 
Albino within the meaning of the PLRA, the Ninth Circuit also held that a failure to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies should be analyzed under the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
rather than as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, overruling prior precedent. Id. 
 49 See id. at 1167 (“Albino states in a declaration . . . that he was given no orientation when he 
was brought to the jail . . . .”). In discussing this lack of notice, the court noted: 
The jail had a manual describing a procedure for handling inmate complaints, but 
this manual was for staff use only and was not made available to inmates . . . . 
[Complaint] forms had to be requested by an inmate and were never provided to Al-
bino, despite his repeated complaints. Nor was Albino told that he could write a 
complaint on an ordinary piece of paper and hand it to one of the deputies. 
See id. at 1177 
 50 Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2007). In denying Baca’s peti-
tion for certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court also implicitly endorsed the approach taken by the 
Ninth Circuit. See Scott v. Albino, 135 S. Ct. 403, 403 (2014). Additionally, the Third Circuit, in 
dicta, has suggested that it would follow the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to notice. See Small v. 
Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 271 (3rd Cir. 2013) (“Remedies that are not reasonably communi-
cated to inmates may be considered unavailable for exhaustion purposes.”). Other courts, like the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuit, have held that, although a prisoner’s 
subjective knowledge of prison procedure is irrelevant to exhaustion, objective notice of the griev-
ance procedure may at least be a relevant consideration. See Tope v. Fabian, No. CIV 09-0734 
DWF/RLE, 2010 WL 3307351, *9 (D. Minn. July 29, 2010) (holding that, although some courts 
have held that a prisoner’s subjective knowledge is immaterial, objective notice of the grievance 
procedure is still a relevant consideration.) Nevertheless, an inmate may not close his eyes to a 
prison grievance system and then claim there were no available administrate remedies. Hall v. 
Sheahan, No. 2000 C. 1649, 2001 WL 111019, at *2 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 2, 2001) (“[A]n inmate may 
not close his eyes to what he reasonably should have known.”). 
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never permitted to see and which was not included in a handbook that was 
provided to inmates, was effectively unavailable.51 The court stressed that a 
remedy that has not been made known to an inmate is effectively unavailable 
to that inmate.52 Under this reasoning, defendants must show that they in-
formed the plaintiff of the grievance procedure.53 When an inmate does not 
know about a remedy and cannot discover it through reasonable effort, that 
remedy is effectively unavailable.54 A prison official’s failure to provide a 
prisoner with information about administrative remedies may excuse the pris-
oner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.55 
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuit’s approach to notice is in contrast to the 
strict approach advocated by the dissent in Albino, as well as the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.56 Under this stricter 
analysis, prison officials are under no duty to inform prisoners of a grievance 
process.57 A notice requirement is not necessary because prisoners are pre-
sumed to know about prison procedures.58 This approach is consistent with 
the idea that the statutory exhaustion requirement is mandatory, and futility 
and other exceptions should not be read into it.59 Under the strict approach, a 
court need not expend precious judicial resources determining the details of a 
prison’s grievance procedure implementation.60 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See 510 F.3d at 1322–23. 
 52 Id. at 1323 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001) (“That which is unknown 
and unknowable is unavailable; it is not ‘capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose.’”). 
 53 See Tope, 2010 WL 3307351, at *8; Hall, 2001 WL 111019, at *2 (“An institution cannot 
keep inmates in ignorance of the grievance procedure and then fault them for not using it.”). 
 54 Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1324. 
 55 See Arnold v. Goetz, 245 F. Supp. 2d 527, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 56 Compare 747 F.3d at 1177 (holding that administrative remedies were effectively unavail-
able to a prisoner who was not informed of prison grievance procedures), and Goebert, 510 F.3d 
at 1321–23 (finding that a prison grievance procedure described in a manual provided only to staff 
was effectively unavailable), with Twitty v. McCoskey, 226 F. App’x 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(asserting that a prisoner is strictly responsible for exhausting administrative remedies absent any 
affirmative misconduct on the part of prison officials), Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 809 n.9 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (noting that prison officials do not have to affirmatively provide information on how to 
utilize grievance procedures), judgment vacated, 549 U.S. 1190 (2007), abrogated by Jones v. 
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), and Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that prison officials need not advise prisoners of the need to follow administrative procedures). 
 57 See Gonzales-Liranza v. Naranjo, 76 F. App’x. 270, 272 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[A]s a matter of 
law, any factual dispute between the parties as to whether or not plaintiff was ever advised or 
informed of the prison’s grievance procedures was not relevant.”). 
 58 Albino, 747 F.3d at 1182 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“[L]itigants . . . [are] presumed to have 
knowledge of duly enacted laws, regulations, and procedures. Grievance procedures in California 
jails are promulgated under the direction of state laws and regulations.” (citation omitted)). 
 59 See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6 (“[W]e stress the point . . . that we will not read futility or 
other exceptions into [PLRA’s] statutory exhaustion requirement . . . .”). 
 60 See Griffin v. Romero, 399 F. App’x 349, 351 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining that Congress 
intended to spare courts the need to spend countless hours educating themselves as to details of 
prison administrative processes); Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1354 (3d Cir. 2002) 
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III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT  
AND ADOPT THE NINTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUIT  
APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF NOTICE 
The U.S. Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split, adopt the ap-
proach taken by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Goebert v. Lee 
County, and hold that to fail to give a prisoner notice of an administrative 
remedy is to make that remedy effectively unavailable.61 Section A argues 
that, although the Court denied Baca’s petition for certiorari in this case, the 
Court should grant certiorari in the future to address the circuit split and lend 
uniformity and clarity to this area of the law.62 Section B argues that when the 
Court grants certiorari on this issue, the Court should adopt the approach tak-
en by the Eleventh Circuit in Goebert and explicitly require notice of admin-
istrative remedies because this is most consistent with the policies underlying 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).63 
A. The U.S. Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari  
on This Issue in the Future 
The U.S. Supreme Court should grant certiorari to address the circuit 
split and lend uniformity and clarity to this area of the law.64 As the law cur-
rently stands, the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits have held that a prisoner must 
receive notice of an administrative remedy for the remedy to be available, but 
the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held that a prisoner need not re-
ceive notice of an administrative remedy in order for it to be available.65 Be-
                                                                                                                           
(“Congress did not intend for courts to expend scarce judicial resources examining how and by 
whom a prison's grievance procedure was implemented.”). 
 61 See 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007); supra note 56 and accompanying text (illustrat-
ing the circuit split regarding whether a lack of notice of prison procedures excuses a prisoner’s 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies). 
 62 See infra notes 64–70 and accompanying text. 
 63 See infra notes 71–82 and accompanying text. 
 64 See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1181 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Smith, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he majority’s opinion creates a split with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits . . . .”), cert. denied 
sub nom., Scott v. Albino, 135 S. Ct. 403 (2014). Although the Court denied certiorari in Albino, 
the issue raised in Albino will inevitably be raised again in the future due to the frequency of pris-
oner lawsuits. Scott, 135 S. Ct. at 403; see Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1324; Twitty v. McCoskey, 226 
F. App’x 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2007); Belbot, supra note 1, at 396 (noting the high frequency of 
prisoner lawsuits). 
 65 Compare Albino, 747 F.3d at 1177 (finding that administrative remedies were unavailable 
when a prisoner was not informed of prison grievance procedures), and Goebert, 510 F.3d at 
1321–23 (holding that a remedy was unavailable when it was described in a manual provided only 
to prison officials), with Twitty, 226 Fed. App’x at 596 (noting that only affirmative conduct and 
not general inaction by prison officials may excuse a failure to exhaust), Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 
801, 809 n.9 (6th Cir. 2005) (asserting that prison officials do not have to affirmatively provide 
information on how to utilize grievance procedures), judgment vacated, 549 U.S. 1190 (2007), 
abrogated by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), and Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th 
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yond this split in authority, confusion in this area of the law is exacerbated by 
how the issue has been discussed in court opinions.66 For example, even 
when a court has addressed the issue of notice in the context of exhaustion, 
the legal authority for ruling on this issue is not always clear.67 Further, courts 
often implicitly take into account whether a prisoner received notice in de-
termining whether administrative remedies are exhausted, but decline to ad-
dress the issue explicitly or only address it in dicta.68 The detrimental effects 
of these shortcomings are particularly dangerous given the high frequency of 
lawsuits subject to the PLRA.69 Because of the lack of uniformity among the 
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2001) (holding that prison officials need not advise prisoners of the need to follow administra-
tive procedures). See generally Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining that 
Section 1997e(a) is silent on a prisoner’s subjective beliefs about available administrative reme-
dies). 
 66 See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1177 (failing to provide legal authority to support its holding that 
an administrative remedy is effectively unavailable when a prisoner has not received notice of the 
remedy); infra note 68 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases in which courts im-
plicitly took into account whether a prisoner received notice but declined to address the issue 
explicitly). Some cases, like Dillon v. Rogers, note the importance of inmates having avenues for 
discovering administrative remedies, but fail to explicitly address the role of notice. See 596 F.3d 
260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (emphasizing the “importance of ensuring that inmates have avenues for 
discovering the procedural rules governing their grievances,” but declining to elaborate on the role 
of notice). Moreover, some courts explicitly acknowledge when a prisoner has been given notice 
of prison procedures, but fail to elaborate on the topic any further. See, e.g., King v. Iowa Dep’t of 
Corr., 598 F.3d 1051, 1053 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that a grievance response form advised a pris-
oner of his right to appeal, but the prisoner failed to do so); Alexander v. Tippah Cnty., 351 F.3d 
626, 630 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The Detention Facility’s grievance procedures were explained in the 
inmate handbook given to Alexander when he first arrived. Alexander admits that he knew how to 
prepare a handwritten grievance.”); Lyon v. Vande Krol, 305 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(“There is no question in this case that there was [a procedure available], that Mr. Lyon was aware 
of it, and that he chose not to follow the steps that the procedure outlined. Mr. Lyon was never 
told that there was not a procedure . . . .”); Knowles v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr. Comm’r, 538 F. 
Supp. 2d 453, 462 (D.N.H. 2008) (“Nor does the plaintiff claim that he had not received notice of 
the three-level grievance procedure, or was otherwise unaware of it in a way that might arguably 
have made it unavailable to him.”). 
 67 See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1175, 1181, n.1 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority 
failed to cite a single case to support its holding that prison officials must inform prison proce-
dure); Knowles, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (failing to provide legal authority after noting that a pris-
oner did not claim that he had not received notice of prison procedure); Hall v. Sheahan, No. 2000 
C. 1649, 2001 WL 111019, at *2 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 2, 2001) (failing to provide legal authority for the 
proposition that a grievance procedure that is not made known to inmates is effectively unavaila-
ble). 
 68 See, e.g., Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 271 (3rd Cir. 2013) (noting in dictum that 
“[r]emedies that are not reasonably communicated to inmates may be considered unavailable for 
exhaustion purposes”); King, 598 F.3d at 1053 (finding that a prisoner did not exhaust available 
administrative remedies when he failed to appeal his formal complaint because the response form 
advised him of his right to appeal); Frentzel v. Boyer, No. 4:05-CV-2304 CAS, 2007 WL 
1018663, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2007) (“In Chelette . . . however, unlike the present case, there 
was no evidence that the prisoner plaintiff did not know and was not informed of the existence of 
administrative remedies.”), aff’d, 297 F. App’x 576 (8th Cir. 2008).  
 69 Belbot, supra note 1, at 306 (noting the dramatic increase of prisoner lawsuits).  
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circuits, the lack of clarity among holdings on this issue, and the quantity of 
cases subject to these shortcomings, the U.S. Supreme Court should grant a 
writ of certiorari if and when this issue presents itself to the Court in the fu-
ture.70 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Should Adopt The Ninth and Eleventh  
Circuit Approach to Notice 
The U.S. Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split and conclude 
that an administrative remedy is effectively unavailable to a prisoner when 
the prisoner has not been notified of the remedy.71 This approach is most con-
sistent with the policies that underlie the PLRA—administrative agency and 
judicial efficiency.72 
Because a prison populace that is informed of administrative remedies 
may be more likely to use these remedies, a notice requirement protects 
administrative agency by fostering administrative resolutions to prisoner 
complaints. 73  Additionally, providing notice of administrative remedies 
promotes judicial efficiency because it invites inmates to use administrative 
remedies instead of clogging courts with lawsuits that are likely to be dis-
missed on exhaustion grounds.74 Thus, a notice requirement promotes the 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1181 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s opinion creates a 
split with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits.”); King, 598 F.3d at 1053 (finding that a prisoner did not 
exhaust available administrative remedies when he failed to appeal his formal complaint because 
the response form advised him of his right to appeal); Belbot, supra note 1, at 306. 
 71 See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1177; Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1323–24; Burgess v. Garvin, No. 01 
CIV 10994(GEL), 2004 WL 527053, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2004). 
 72 See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) (“Exhaustion serves the twin purposes 
of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.”), superseded by 
statute on other grounds as stated in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); see also Burgess, 
2004 WL 527053, at *5 (“[Congress] cannot have meant that prisoners would be expected to ex-
haust remedies of which they were kept entirely ignorant.”); 141 CONG. REC. S14418 (daily ed. 
Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting that roughly 94.7 percent of prisoner lawsuits in 
1994 were dismissed before pretrial); 141 CONG. REC. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (state-
ment of Sen. Kyl) (“Federal prison lawsuits have risen from two thousand in 1970 to 39,000 in 
1994.”). 
 73 See Russell v. Unknown Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Officers, No. C 3786, 2004 WL 2997503, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2004) (“[A notice requirement] is fully consonant with the goals of the 
PLRA, which aims to foster internal administrative resolutions to inmates’ complaints in lieu of 
litigation in the courts.”). 
 74 See Russell, 2004 WL 2997503, at *4 (explaining that providing notice “direct[s] inmates 
to follow mandatory grievance procedures, instead of letting them file lawsuits that will be dis-
missed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies”); Burgess, 2004 WL 527053, at *3 (“If the 
matter can be resolved without recourse to the federal courts . . . then the purpose of judicial econ-
omy is fulfilled.”); Slutsky, supra note 5, at 2298 (“The PLRA seeks to deter frivolous suits by 
improving judicial efficiency. Administrative exhaustion is a prime example of a provision that 
attempts to accomplish this goal.”). 
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consideration of meritorious claims by preventing frivolous suits from reach-
ing court.75 
In addition to advancing the policies underlying the PLRA, the notice 
requirement addresses a weakness of the strict approach advocated by the 
dissent in Albino.76 Under the strict approach, a prisoner who is unaware of 
administrative remedies may be precluded from both timely administrative 
relief and legal relief.77 In contrast, because a prisoner who is put on notice of 
administrative remedies is more likely to utilize such remedies, a notice re-
quirement decreases the likelihood of a prisoner being completely denied the 
opportunity for relief.78 
A notice requirement also protects against unfair treatment of prisoners 
and furthers policies of basic fairness.79 For example, a notice requirement 
protects against hide-and-seek behavior on the part of prison administrators.80 
Similarly, it protects prisoners who are unaware of their obligation to investi-
gate administrative remedies through no fault of their own.81 Finally, a notice 
requirement comports with how courts have read objectivity into their inter-
pretation of the availability of remedies: that is, similarly situated individuals 
of ordinary firmness may not deem remedies available when such remedies 
have not been communicated to them.82 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 730 (8th Cir. 2004) (observing that the PLRA was 
intended to prevent frivolous lawsuits and ensure that courts are limited to hearing legitimate vio-
lations of prisoners’ rights); Tracy M. Sullivan, Prisoners Seeking Monetary Relief for Civil 
Rights Claims: Must They Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under § 1997e Before Filing a Claim 
in Federal Court?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 419, 422 (2002) (“Proponents of the PLRA regarded 
many of the prisoner civil rights lawsuits as wasting judicial resources and depriving others of 
quality justice.”). 
76 See 747 F.3d at 1181 (Smith, J., dissenting) (opposing the majority's holding that jail offi-
cials must show they informed prisoners of administrative remedies); Gonzales-Liranza v. Na-
ranjo, 76 F. App’x 270, 272 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[A]s a matter of law, any factual dispute between 
the parties as to whether or not plaintiff was ever advised or informed of the prison’s grievance 
procedures was not relevant.”). 
77 See Yousef, 254 F.3d at 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming the dismissal of a prisoner lawsuit 
because a prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies). 
78 See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1177 (refusing to dismiss a prisoner lawsuit for failure to exhaust 
when prison officials did not inform the prisoner of the availability of administrative remedies). 
 79 See id. at 1169; Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1323 (“If we allowed jails and prisons to play hide-and-
seek with administrative remedies, they could keep all remedies under wraps until after a lawsuit is 
filed and then uncover them and proclaim that the remedies were available all along.”); Romanelli v. 
Suliene, No. 3:07-cv-00019-bbc, 2008 WL 4587110, at *6 (W.D. Wisc. Jan. 10, 2008) (justifying 
a notice requirement because of the incentive for prison officials to conceal grievance procedures). 
 80 Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1323 (noting the risks of allowing prison officials to engage in hide-
and-seek behavior with administrative remedies). 
 81 See Romanelli, 2008 WL 4587110, at *6 (“It would be unfair to require the prisoner to con-
duct his own investigation, particularly because in many cases he would be unaware of his obligation 
to do so.”). 
 82 See Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 688 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The test for deciding 
whether the ordinary grievance procedures were available must be an objective one: that is, would 
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CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Albino v. 
Baca reinforces the stance held by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that 
to fail to give a prisoner notice of an administrative remedy is to make that 
remedy effectively unavailable. The decision widens the circuit split on this 
issue, creating an opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the issue 
of notice in the context of exhaustion and ultimately affirm the approach held 
by the Eleventh and the Ninth Circuits. In doing so, the Court could further 
the policies underlying the Prison Litigation Reform Act and prevent unfair 
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‘a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness’ have deemed them available.”); supra note 
33 and accompanying text (discussing the objective standard for determining whether or not ad-
ministrative remedies were available). 
